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DELUSION IN THE COURTROOM:
THE ROLE OF PARTIAL INSANITY IN EARLY
FORENSIC TESTIMONY
by
JOEL PETER EIGEN *
Standing in the dock at the Old- Bailey in 1833, Noah Pease Folger, Captain of
the Sophia, seemed the soul of propriety. "No man was more kind hearted and
human . . .", testified another ship's captain, who saw Folger three weeks before he
attempted to kill Mr Mellish, the owner of the Sophia. Certainly "kind hearted and
human" persons, ifbrought to the point ofrage, had been known to commit acts of
the most inhuman barbarity, yet Folger evinced a singular sort of distraction. His
disorder, the jury was told, only began "when the subject which caused his malady
was raised . . . he was quite calm and collected till Mr. Mellish's name came into
question". In his moments ofdeep derangement, the Captain ofthe Sophia had been
known to break window panes with his bare fists, dance on the broken glass, strip
naked, and complete the episode by jumping on the back of a passing whale. With
suchavividly illustratedhistory ofmadness, why should there have been any question
regarding his plea of insanity?
Although the captain's antics may strike the twentieth-century reader as
persuasive grounds for a defence of insanity, the legal stricture of total madness as
the criterion for an acquittal meant that it was actually the captain's rational
moments which were on trial; for example, his confession immediately following
arrest-"I shot him, I know the laws ofmycountry and I shall be hung for it". Jurors
also heard reports ofthe captain's self-composure when he forgot about the torments
he attributed to his nemesis. Without a conception ofthe mind which allowed for the
possibility oflimited, circumscribed seats ofmadness, the captain's equanimity on his
smooth-sailing days might well have militated against an acquittal. How was thejury
in the Folger case, and in similar trials heard in London in the second quarter ofthe
nineteenth century, brought to an understanding ofthe possibility ofhidden madness
in the mind of an otherwise reasonable person?
Contemporary efforts to capture how inhabitants of earlier historical periods
conceived of the mind of the mad have drawn on a variety of sources, and include
scholarly investigations of the history of ideas and thought systems, medical tracts
published by madhouse keepers and mad-doctors, and in a few instances, memoirs of
recovered melancholics. Ofcontinuing interest in this historical endeavour has been
the effort to discern fundamental shifts and refinements in the conceptualization of
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howthe maddiffered from the sane. One such historical shift, traceable in bothclinical
and medical writings, was the transition from total to partial insanity. The various
conceptual manoeuvres used to effect the acceptance of partial insanity-lucid
intervals, delirepartiel, monomania-have been explored in the medical and scholarly
literature. The present paper aims to describe the diffusion of clinical and
psychological notions ofpartial insanity into the critical arena ofthe criminal trial, a
forum which forcenturies had witnessed the rejection ofpartial states ofderangement
as grounds for an acquittal.
What follows is an analysis ofmedical testimony offered in insanity trials in London
between the years 1825 and 1843, the period which witnessed a six-fold increase in the
participation of medical witnesses at the Old Bailey,' and which culminated in the
formation of the Insanity Rules during the trial of Daniel McNaughtan. Because
criminal responsibility traditionally rested with the actor's capacity to understand the
nature of his actions and the consequences such actions would likely bring, medical
testimony regarding themental stateoftheaccused provides acompellingglimpse into
the introduction and application of clinical conceptions of partial insanity to
traditional legal notions ofcriminal responsibility. Particularly valuable are the voices
of medical witnesses who endeavoured to work changing perceptions of mental
derangement into a rendering ofthe mind ofthe prisoner which the legal community
wouldfinddifficult to dismiss. Byanalysingmedical aswell as laytestimony overtime,
today's historian offorensic psychiatry can also investigate how contemporary social
actorsunderstood thefunctioning ofthemind, theintegration ofvariousfaculties, and
the acceptance of an insanity that was confined to an idea or a limited number of
subjects. The fit of partial insanity, represented most often by the term "delusion",
accompanied by the criminal activity exemplified by the hapless, whale-jumping
Captain of the Sophia, is the subject of this paper.
PARTIAL INSANITY IN LEGAL CONTEXT
At the heart of the legal concept of criminal responsibility lies the defendant's
intention.2 Ifguilt arose only in the commission ofan act, the effort to reconstruct the
mental state ofthe offender atthe time ofthecrime would matterlittle, ifat all. A legal
systembased on strictliability-which appears to have been in forcein England before
the Middle Ages-would be solely concerned with determining the cause ofdeath and
identifying the responsible party.3 By the twelfth century, the nature of criminal
i Joel P. EigenandGregoryAndoll, 'From mad-doctor to forensic witness: theevolution ofearly English
court psychiatry', Int. J. Law Psychiat., 1986, 9: 159-69.
2 For discussions of intention, criminal responsibility, and the common law, see Glanville Williams,
Criminallaw, thegeneralpart, 2nded., London, Stevens & Sons, 1961, pp. 30-53; James Fitzjames Stephen,
A history of the criminal law of England, vol. 2, London, Macmillan, 1883, pp. 94-114, 124-86; Roger
Smith, Trial by medicine: insanity and responsibility in Victorian trials, Edinburgh University Press, 1981,
pp. 67-96. The most complete analysis of the historical evolution of legal thinking on madness and
responsibility may be found in Nigel D. Walker, Crime and insanity in England, vol. 1, The historical
perspective, Edinburgh University Press, 1968. Further investigation of courtroom applications of
intentionality and insanity is offered in Joel P. Eigen, 'Intentionality and insanity; what the eighteenth-
centuryjuror heard', in W. F. Bynum, R. Porter, and M. Shepherd (eds.) The anatomy ofmadness, vol. 2,
Institutions and society, London, Tavistock, 1985, pp. 34-51.
3 Walker, op. cit., note 2 above.
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responsibility grew more problematic as for the first time, a mention of the mental
element becamenecessary forthefixingofguilt: thewill to harm. Onlythe actorwhose
stateofmindpermitted anunderstandingofthe(moral)wrongfulness ofhisbehaviour
and who retained the capacity not to choose a course ofaction, could be said to have
acted intentionally; with the will to harm.
Thecapacity to understand the events surrounding one'scourse ofaction, however,
is not an "either-or" faculty. While some people, idiots for example, were clearly
beyond any rationality, other persons appeared deranged "by degrees". The cultural
and medical acknowledgement of a range of pathological mental states challenged
jurists to formulate a standard as to the requisite level of impairment which would
merit adefenceagainstpunishment(initially),andconviction(eventually). Legal tracts
written by Sir Matthew Haleand LordCoke, togetherwithjudicialinstructionsdating
to thelateeighteenthcentury, revealthatjuries weretraditionallyinstructedthatonly a
total want of memory and understanding-a total insanity- would satisfy the law's
criterion for exemption from culpability. Partial states of madness, melancholy for
example, in which individuals retained the level ofunderstanding that a youth of 14
might be expected to possess, left the partially deranged answerable for their conduct
because they were deemed capable of distinguishing right from wrong.4
By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, terms such as melancholy,
mania, and delirium, indeed the entire conceptualization of insanity in strictly
"intellectualist" terms, were the subject ofclinical and philosophical revaluation and
subsequently, reclassification. The claims of various schools-associationism,
phrenology, "Common Sense" philosophy-to explain the mind's capacity to
understand and to reason, begged the traditional legal categories oftotal and partial
insanity. Althoughjudges continued to employ such criteria as "knowing right from
wrong" and "knowing what one was about" in their instructions to thejury, medical
testimony in the second quarter of the nineteenth century argued persuasively that
defendants who generally knew the difference between right and wrong could
nonetheless be either incapable ofunderstanding the blameworthiness ofa particular
action, or unable to resist the force of a preoccupying passion. In short, medical
witnesses employed language and images which challenged thejurors to question the
existence of a mind integrated in its faculties and consistent in its consciousness.
SOURCE OF DATA AND OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS FINDINGS
Althoughcriminaltrials were nottheonlylegalforum inwhichmental stateswereof
critical significance-coroners' inquests and lunacy commissions often witnessed
testimony about severederangement5-few tribunalsconstituted aspublic an event as
a felony prosecution. Not only were criminal trials themselves matters ofgreat public
interest; reportsofprosecutions were also thesubjects ofseeminglyunlimitedcuriosity
within English society. From the Elizabethan era on, pamphlets known as crime
chap-books provided lurid and sensational descriptions of criminal trials and
4 Matthew Hale, The history ofthepleas ofthe crown, London, E. R. Nutt, 1736, pp. 30-7.
5 MichaelMacDonald, 'Insanityand therealitiesofhistory inearlymodernEngland',Psych. Med., 1981,
11: 25. See also MacDonald's 'The inner side ofwisdom: suicide in early modern England', ibid., 1977, 7:
565-82, and 'The secularisation of suicide in England 1600-1800', Past and Present, 1986, 111: 50-97.
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subsequent sentencing. Written by non-lawyers for sale to the general public, they
offered the London populace "freshly committed, freshly prosecuted crimes".6
Beginning in 1674, a new source of trial reports, the Old Bailey Sessions Papers
(hereafter OBSP) provided testimony given at London's Central Criminal Court, the
Old Bailey. In 1775 the Common Council for the City of London ordered the
publishing of the papers, thus institutionalizing a practice already begun by
"enterprising commercial printers" who dispatched shorthand writers to the Old
Bailey to record the proceedings.7 Written neither in the language of contemporary
medical treatises nor that oflegal documents, these narratives offer a glimpse into the
thoughts and language of the proverbial person on the (London) street.8
Earlier work examining testimony in felony prosecutions has investigated trials
heard at the Old Bailey from 1760 to 1815, and included all trials in which mental
debility was raised as a possible exculpatory factor.9 The ways in which this was done
could range from a prisoner's relatively casual statement-"I was out ofmy wits at the
time"-to the formal use ofmedical witnesses testifying about the defendant's history
of inexplicable behaviour and perhaps the presence of a mad lineage. Medical
witnesses in the late 1700swere by far the exception, appearing in no more than ten per
cent ofinsanity trials.10 Not onlywas their appearance infrequent, their testimony was
quite unremarkable. "I have looked upon him as a man insane" constituted a
commonly heard example of "expert" testimony. When pressed for the basis of this
conclusion, medical witnesses most often described the prisoner's inability to carry on
a conversation, to follow a question with a logical answer. Ideas, the court and jury
learned, were seldom connected in any rational way. Rather, the most often-heard
descriptions of the verbal patterns of the mad were "flighty", and "inconsistent".
The imagery found in eighteenth-century medical testimony flows directly from the
fundamental tenets of associationism, the dominant school of psychology in the
mid-to-late 1700s. Based onthe Lockeanbeliefthatallknowledgeoriginates insensory
experience and in the subsequent patterns ofthought which result from our sensations
ofthe outside world, associationism maintained that the repetition ofsensations and
their resulting ideas become associated with one another and combine to form, in the
vernacular, a "train of thought". It was in the train of thought that Locke initially
distinguished the sane from the mad. The mad, "having joined together some ideas
very wrongly ... mistake them for Truths .. . as though incoherent ideas have been
cementedtogethersopowerfully astoremainunited"."l Bythelateeighteenthcentury,
6John H. Langbein, 'The criminal trial before the lawyers', Univ. Chicago Law Rev., 1978, 45: 267-72.
7 Thomas Rogers Forbes, Surgeons at the Bailey. Englishforensic medicine to 1878, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1985, pp. 15-23.
8 Langbein, op. cit., note6above, p. 271. Theauthorscrutinized the historical credibility ofthe OBSPby
employing the shorthand trial notes of Judge Dudley Ryder, who presided during the 1760s. When the
judge's notes have been set against the trial narratives, the papers have been deemed reliable. See
Langbein's 'Shaping the eighteenth-century criminal trial, a view from the Ryder sources', Univ. Chicago
Law Rev., 1983, 50: 1-16.
9 Eigen, op. cit., note 2 above.
10Ibid.
II John Locke, An essay concerning human understanding (1690), ed. John Yolton, London, Everyman,
1961. For an expanded discussion ofassociationism, see Robert Hoeldtke, 'The history ofassociationism
and British medical psychology', Med. Hist., 1967, 11: 45-65.
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insanity had come to be identified with abnormal patterns in the association ofideas
which profoundly disturbed the individual's judgement. These abnormal patterns
were traceable, theoretically, to anatomical defects in sensation.12
A physiological grounding for associationism was not imparted to thejury. Rather,
purely mentalist notions of a random disorder in the train of thought, conveyed by
the terms "flighty" and "incoherent", were proffered by medical witnesses who
perhaps had little interest (or knowledge) in the more "academical" conceptions of
the mind.'3 Indeed, their testimony referred predominantly to common-sense
expectations th-at ideas expressed in seriatim should bear some relation to one
another, that an answer given by the prisoner should bear some relation to the
question asked. Clearly, it required no medical training to interpret an answer as
incoherent, or a general conversation as flighty. Neighbours, lovers, and relatives
were perfectly well positioned to hear and recount examples of delirious speech.
Further, lay witnesses also had the advantage ofsupplementing an example offlighty
conversation with knowledge ofthe accused's history ofbizarre behaviour; baying at
the moon, uncontrollable laughter, a penchant for running naked through the streets
holding lighted candles. As Roy Porter has written, the lunacy of an eighteenth-
century mad person was spectacularly on view. Madness was unmistakable; doubts
about the reliability of "Nature's legibility" troubled few.'4
By the second quarter ofthe nineteenth century, however, trial testimony reveals a
noticeable refinement in medical conceptions ofhow the mad differed from the sane.
Incoherent or flighty conversation gave way, as the most frequently invoked sign of
madness, to a symptom category which, although ubiquitous in the history of
Western thought, only entered the English criminal trial after 1800. When Thomas
Erskine introduced the concept of "delusion" into English criminal jurisprudence
during the trial of James Hadfield, few court bystanders could have foretold that a
quarter of a century later, it would become the term most frequently invoked to
characterize the mind of the mad. Half ofthe medical witnesses who appeared at the
Old Bailey in the second quarter of the nineteenth century to speak in support ofthe
prisoner's plea of insanity employed the idea of delusion or monomania when they
provided a description of the defendants' mental functioning. While lay witnesses
continued to dwell on manifestly legible and audible signs of madness-rambling
conversation, histrionic antics, uncontrollable laughter-medical witnesses
introduced a form of insanity no longer on view to the casual observer. Its very
"'reasoning quality" had to be probed and scrutinized over time to determine the
extent of derangement that attended delusion.
From a tradition of relying upon bizarre behaviour or incoherent conversation to
define the boundary between reason and madness, the third and fourth decade ofthe
nineteenth century witnessed the increasing use of the content of delusions to
demarcate the limits between eccentricity and insanity. Further, where eighteenth-
12 David Hartley, Observations on man, hisframe, his duty, andhis expectations, London, S. Richardson,
1749.
13 See, for example, Dr Reynolds's testimony, OBSP, 1784, Eighth Session, p. 1301.
14 RoyPorter, Mind-forg dmanacles: thehistoryofmadness inEnglandfrom the Restoration to theRegency,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, and London, Athlone Press, 1987, p. 35.
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century medical men had eschewed discussions of the afflicted's thought-world for
fear it would only reify his mis-association ofideas,'5 medical witnesses in the second
quarter ofthe nineteenth century introduced graphically-illustrated delusions directly
into their testimony to illustrate the sway ofa reasoning mania. This was a decidedly
new form of insanity: not mad in the traditional sense of "irrationality", but
irresponsible due to a fateful error in belief. Was it perhaps the very intelligibility of
the prisoner's derangement that led the jurors to acquit?
DELUSION, MELANCHOLIA, AND PARTIAL INSANITY
Medical philosophers and practitioners since antiquity have commented upon
partial forms ofderangement which could exist side-by-side with the afflicted's sane
understanding in all other matters. Care must be taken in transporting the modern
meaning of "delusion" through centuries ofWestern experience because the mental
state described by this term ranged from a misperception of sensory input-i.e.,
illusions or hallucinations-to the misconstruing of an event or notion, and the
subsequent preoccupation with that idea. Although the precise form that
derangementmayhave takenvaried, delusion's presence in ancient, Arabic, medieval,
Renaissance, and early modem European medical writings attests to the historical
familiarity of partial states of derangement, as distinct from all-encompassing
mania.16 Melancholia was considered by the Greeks to bejust such a state, and it was
in the melancholic's prophecies that Aristotle first located the presence of delusion.
The association of delusive fear with melancholia-often concerning abandonment
by God-was to continue throughout the Middle Ages and into early modern
Europe. In the seventeenth century, Robert Burton grouped together religious
delusions, idiosyncratic religious beliefs, and obsessive religious anxieties into his
category, "religious melancholia"'.'7 As often as religious fears and other threatening
preoccupations were recounted and became part ofpopular lore,'8 it is important to
stress that such beliefs did not constitute a separate psychopathological entity. It was
within the domain of melancholia that delusion found its home.
Delusion also began to find a home in non-criminal legal proceedings in the early
decades ofthe eighteenth century. Lunacy hearings held in the Courts ofChancery,
for example, featured testimony about the "wild fancies" of suspected madmen.'9
From an initial reliance on the stereotypical behaviour of the wild distracted
madman, the educated elite oflate seventeenth- andearlyeighteenth-century England
began to base their inference of madness oni the ideas of the madman. Ideas of
possession and demonic influence were therefore secularized-one might say
medicalized-in that fear of possession came to be taken as a sign of an insane
delusion, rather than the grounds to suspect a pact with the Evil One. Evidence oflay
5 Ibid., p. 281.
16 Stanley W. Jackson, Melancholia anddepression:from Hippocratic times to modern times, New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1968.
7 Robert Burton, The anatomy ofmelancholy, vol. 3, New York, Hurd & Houghton, 1864, pp. 365-501.
18 Jackson, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 31-3.
9 MacDonald, 'Insanity and realities' and 'The secularisation', op. cit., note 5 above.
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concurrence in the medical interpretation oflunacycan also be found in the profusion
of findings ofnon compos mentis recorded in suicide hearings in the late seventeenth
century.20
The focus on ideas and beliefs ofthe madman serves to underscore the eighteenth
century's predominant conception of insanity as one ofintellectual, as distinct from
emotional, disturbance. Regardless of the frequency with which delusion appears in
the medical literature as a characterization of the mind of the mad, it should be
stressed that "delirium" remained the stable mental category throughout the late
1700s. Delirium, which traditionally referred to behavioural and mental symptoms
occurring in the wake of physical disease,2' encompassed both a general state of
confusion, as well as specific errors in belief. To account for the organic basis ofsuch
profound confusion, medical writers in the mid-to-late 1700s followed the general
outline ofDavid Hartley's psycho-physiological rendering ofthe link between mental
derangement and organic pathology in the faulty mechanism of vibration and
sensation, resulting in the delirium of misassociated ideas. Some disturbance, some
irritation in nerve endings relaying raw sensory input to the brain, impaired the
mind's capacity to consider and compare incoming ideas with those already present.
Medical texts published in the second halfofthe eighteenth century reveal a range
of opinions regarding the precise nature ofmadness, and the possibility that mental
disturbance could be limited to one subject. In 1758, William Battie characterized
madness as deluded imagination, restricting the concept ofdelusion to an irritation in
sensory input.22 Battie's use of delusion resembles "ideal delirium", a classification
articulated later in the century by Thomas Arnold, which signified sensory
disturbance. Arnold's second category, "notional delirium", delineated a further
refinement in derangement: "without the slightest distinguishable trace of ideal
delirium . . . and with the sound and unimpaired use of rational faculties . . the
patient in relation to some particular object . . . is under the influence of the most
palpable and extraordinary delusion."23 Arnold was not alone in the effort to
20 MacDonald, 'The inner side', op. cit., note 5 above.
21 G. E. Berrios, 'Delirium andconfusion in the nineteenth century: aconceptual history', Br. J. Psychiat.,
1981, 139: 439-49. See also H. Werlinder, Psychopathy: a history ofthe concepts, analysis ofthe origin and
development of afamily of concepts in psychopathology, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, 1978,
pp. 26-8.
22William J. Battie, A treatise on madness, London, John Clarke, 1758, pp. 5-6. Battie's apparent
narrowing ofmadness to "deluded imagination" was forcefully rejected by John Monro. "Does the naked
wanderer suffer from deluded imagination?" Those who recover, continued Monro, describe their
experiences as a total suspension of every rational activity. Clearly, Monro conceived of madness in the
traditional sphere ofoverwhelming derangement. Only a global disturbance could explain the "otherness"
of the mad: the confused and incoherent speech, the flightiness of their ideas, their hallucinations and
delusion. For an expanded discussion ofMonro's differences with Battie, see John Monro, Remarks on Dr
Battie's treatise on madness, London, John Clarke, 1758.
23 The role ofthe senses in misleading the individual into embracing delusive notions placed some mental
states into the category of"ideal insanity". Thus Arnold wrote ofa learned man, who "fancied that his legs
were nothing but glass, and for that reason dared on no account to venture to stand upon them". The
scholar was cured by his surly parlour maid who tired ofher master's insanity and "gave him a smart blow
on the leg with one ofthe logs ... [thus provoked, he] rose from his seat in a violent hurry to revenge the
insult ... happy to find that his legs would support him; and his mind was from that time perfectly freed
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demarcate various states ofderangement. The Birmingham physician John Johnstone
employed the term "predominant idea" to distinguish madness from delirium. In
madness, an all-consuming "predominant idea" interfered with, and deranged all
trains of thought with which it was "intermixed". Delirium, on the other hand, was
"but a wild and incoherentjumble ofideas".24 Although the inconsistent use ofsuch
key terms as "delirium" and "delusion" makes itdifficult to infer the precise nature of
innovative nosologies which appear in the late eighteenth century, theoretically at
least, both Johnstone's conception ofmadness as "predominant idea", and Arnold's
classification ofnotional delirium allowed for a conception ofmental disturbance as
restricted or circumscribed impairment, a condition somewhat short of global and
consistent derangement.
Clearly several issues were being raised in this late eighteenth-century effort to
explain exactly what madness consisted of, and whether disturbance could be limited
to a particular subject. In some respects, the attempt to distinguish forms of
derangement by the extent of impairment was only the latest manifestation of a
historic debate regarding mania and melancholia. Was the periodic display ofcalm, if
dolorous, demeanour, merely a temporary lapse of furious mania? Early in the
nineteenth century, John Haslam addressed this classic conundrum, as well as the
emerging opinion that centred derangement on a particular subject, by writing that
madmen wereequally deranged upon a wide variety ofsubjects. He vigorously denied
that the mind of the delusional was "rational" on all other subjects. The apparent
display ofrationality was but a lucid interval. Let the conversation be protracted, let
the discourse drift to "the favourite subject ... afloat in the mad man's brain, and [the
observer] will be convinced of the hastiness of his decision."25
Haslam's forceful opinion regarding the presence of generalized delirium even in
those cases where derangement appeared to be limited to a particular subject, did not
inhibit other medical writers from constructing definitions ofinsanity that suggested
a circumscribed error ofjudgement. George Edward Male, Haslam's contemporary
and one ofthe founders ofEnglish medicaljurisprudence, averred that insanity "may
be called a delusion . .. [an] erroneous association ofideas on particular subjects."26
Although few authors went so far as Alexander Morison when he elevated delusion
into the condition "sufficient to excuse the commission ofa crime",27 one discerns in
the rapidly growing corpus of medical opinion in the early nineteenth century, the
from this absurd imagination". Arnold's separation of types of deliria follows his conviction that "ideal
insanity" describes those perceptual errors that could be corrected by the senses; "notional insanity" isjust
that notions or ideas that are not amenable to correction by the proper decoding ofsensory information.
For anexpanded discussion ofArnold's ideas, see Thomas Arnold, Observation on the nature, kind, causes,
andprevention ofinsanity, London, Richard Phillips, 1806.
24 John Johnstone, Medicaljurisprudence ofmadness, Birmingham, J. Belcher, 1800, p. 23.
25 John Haslam, Observations on madness andmelancholy: includingpractical remarks on those diseases:
together with cases: and an account ofthe morbid appearances on dissection, London, J. Callow, 1809.
26George Edward Male, Elementsofjuridicalorforensic medicine:for the useofmedicalmen, coronersand
barristers, London, E. Cox & Son, 1818, p. 202.
27 Alexander Morison, Outlines oflectures on mental diseases, London, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown,
Green & S. Highley, 1826. Morison clearly considered delusion to be of major legal importance; his
comments do not necessarily allow the inference that medical opinion was unanimous on the centrality of
delusion to madness.
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emergence and acceptance of states of madness which were distinguished from
generalized delirium by their seeming confinement to a "predominant idea'.
Increasingly, "delusion" was employed to describe such a state.
When medical theorists narrowed their conception of madness to an erroneous
association aboutparticular subjects, they did not put forward acorresponding model
of the mind which would adequately account for specificity of thought disturbance.
Given Hartley's initial physiological model, which drew together a concatenation of
nerve endings, tightly-packed filaments, and associated mental images, it was not at
all clear how the mind could be deranged on only one particular subject or set of
ideas. In contrast, the neuro-anatomist Franz JosefGall proffered an explanation of
the mind's functioning which considered the cerebral localization of psychological
faculties as its fundamental principle, and explained the idiosyncrasy ofcharacter by
the uneven development of innate psychological faculties situated in the brain.28
According to Gall, Locke's view ofmadness-disordered reason andjudgement-
onlycharacterized those persons suffering a general alienation or acomplete insanity.
To account for derangement restricted to a particular subject, one had to seek the
particularity ofcharacter to be found in any of27 determinate faculties, each with its
own organ in the brain. As these organs functioned independently ofone another, the
corresponding psychological faculty could be deranged in isolation. It was thus the
"organ of self preservation", of "sexual gratification", or perhaps of "cunning"
which was implicated in a (criminally) insane act committed by an otherwise kind
and gentle person. Gall and those who adhered to his model sought an explanation
for the peculiarities of thought and behaviour in the variable state of the affecting
organ, be it overdeveloped, underdeveloped, or in some way damaged.29 When its
unusual state was discerned-either externally (by cranial inspection), or internally
(after an autopsy)-an explanation was readily apparent: the faculty was distorted
because its sensory products were refracted through the medium ofa damaged organ.
Although phrenology enjoyed considerable popularity in the second quarter ofthe
nineteenth century among the general public and in scientific circles as well, it was not
without itsdetractors.30 Gall's sterling credentials as a neuro-anatomist could only go
so far; the simple truth was that he could not demonstrate the existence of his
determinate organs. His psychology ofparticular faculties therefore shared the same
shortcoming as earlier explanations which relied on innate, inductive mental
capacities: circularity. Still, his public lectures and publications reached a very wide
audience and offered an intriguing conception of a modular mind: one that could
house partial derangement while the person appeared sane in all other faculties.3'
What Gall failed to offer was an application of his phrenological principles to the
28 Gall's interests in particularity led him beyond a consideration of normative faculties will, reason,
and reflection which all members of a species share. Instead he sought to illuminate the array of
determinate attributes which distinguish the character, talent, and disposition of one person from other
members ofthe species. See Rober M. Young, Mind, brain andadaptation in the nineteenth century: cerebral
localisation and its biological context from Gall to Ferrier, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970, pp. 9-53.
29 Roger Cooter, The cultural meaning ofpopular science, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
30 Young, op. cit., note 28 above, p. 22. For other criticisms of Gall see Cooter, op. cit., note 29 above,
pp. 22-8.
3 The WeeklyMedico-ChirurgicalandPhilosophicalMaga-zine, 24May 1823, no. 16,pp.247-50; 9August,
no. 27, pp. 18-21. For a discussion ofthe different faculty psychology approaches to the mind, see Jerry A.
Fodor, The modularity ofmind: an essay onfaculty psychology, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1983.
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terminology of medico-legal jurisprudence-partial insanity, melancholia, delirium
-or a persuasive rationale tojustify exempting from criminal responsibility a person
with an enlarged "organ of self-protection".32
The first sustained attempt to apply the notion of a limited, circumscribed
derangement to the legal implications of the partial insanity concept was assayed by
the French school ofmedecin mentale headed by Philippe Pinel, J. E. D. Esquirol, and
Etienne Georget. Their interest in delire partiel was intrinsic to a fundamental
questioning ofmental derangement as primarily a matter of intellectual disturbance.
As late as 1816, William Cullen had defined partial insanity as "a false and mistaken
judgment upon one particular subject, and what relates to it; whilst, on every other
subject, the person affected judges as the generality of other men do".33 His
conception of partial insanity reveals the enduring view of derangement as an
intellectual defect: insanity as delirium. Against this long-held tradition, Pinel
asserted the existence ofmanie sans dMlire, a mental disorder without reasoning defect,
delusion, or hallucination. Instead, the afflicted was under the dominion of an
abstract fury, experiencing no "lesion of understanding". Such a conception of
mental alienation had profound implications for medical jurisprudence because the
fundamental criterion of criminal responsibility was the actor's capacity to
understand the nature of what he was doing. Pinel's formulation suggested that
understanding could remain intact while the individual was carried away by some
blind force, perhaps by a will no longer informed (or constrained) by conscious
choice. Although he did not draw out the forensic implications of manie sans dMlire,
nor specifically denominate his term as a form of partial insanity, the model of the
mind's functioning which he envisioned would make more problematic the task of
determining the actor's intent, since it now appeared that understanding and will
might operate more or less independently from one another.
Pinel's student, Esquirol, continued the effort to refine traditional conceptions of
mental pathology by bringing nineteenth-century disease classification into line with
contemporary French psychology.34 The decline of humoralism in the eighteenth
century meant that melancholia's long association with black bile appeared as so
much anachronistic residue. In keeping with the emerging sensationalist psychology
ofthe Enlightenment, melancholia was reconceptualized as an irritation or a disorder
of sensitivity in which the mind became preoccupied with a single idea. According to
Esquirol, however, melancholia's association with black bile was only one of its
defects as a classification. Its connection with sadness or a general mournful
disposition was too limiting a characterization of the emotional states which
accompany preoccupation with an idea. To remedy both shortcomings, Esquirol
32 For Gall's views on criminal responsibility, "illusive liberty", and free agency, see The Weekly
Medico-Chirurgical and Philosophical Magazine, 14 June 1823, no. 19, pp. 289-97; 21 June, no. 20,
pp. 305-10; 5 July, no. 22, pp. 337-40; and 12 July, no. 23, pp. 353-7.
3 Although Cullen acknowledged that such cases existed, his own opinion was that "the limits between
general and partial insanity cannot always be so exactly assigned". Stanley W. Jackson, 'Melancholia
and partial insanity', J. Hist. behav. Sci., 1983, 19: 173-84. See also William Cullen, Nosology: or a
systematic arrangement ofdiseases, Edinburgh, C. Stewart, 1800.
34Jan Goldstein, Console and classify: the French psychiatric profession in the nineteenth century,
Cambridge University Press, 1987; see especially pp. 245-57.
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proposed his own neologism, "monomania", which would combine the (former)
melancholic's fixed concentration on an idea or set of ideas, with a lively and
expansive disposition.35
According to G. E. Berrios, monomania was a version of the partial insanity
concept,36 except, of course, that it was a full-blown derangement as long as the
afflicted's mind was turned to the delusion. Where Esquirol parted company with
Arnold's notional delirium and Cullen's partial insanity, was in his contention that
monomania could stem not only from a lesion ofthe intellect, but also independently
from the emotions or the will. What he asserted was a fully emotional insanity, one in
which the intellect was not suspended, but rather over-ridden.37 In delirepartiel, for
example, persons "perform acts and hold odd, strange and absurd conversations,
which they regard as such, and for which they censure themselves".38 The
irresistibility ofthis state, according to Esquirol, was a "manifestation ofa secondary
disorder of the volitional faculty".
Disorders of the volitional faculty were further explored by Esquirol's student,
Georget, who divided monomania into lesions ofintelligence (delirium, a disturbance
in the combination of ideas) and lesions of will ("perversion of natural penchants,
affections, and passions"). But it was his classification monomanie homicide which
brought the French alienists into direct collision with the legal community. The
notion that there was a mental state which actually propelled its victims to commit
murder was perceived as both ludicrous and dangerous, and was the occasion of a
forceful denunciation ofmonomania by the lawyer Hannequin: "the need to murder
to satisfy passions or perhaps a system is not an illness or insanity. The doctrine of
monomania tries to excuse crime by crime itself''.39 For the larger legal community,
the domination of a single idea-Esquirol's criterion for monomania-had to be
coupled with delirium if this state was to qualify as insanity. A man was not insane
unless he "has lost either the consciousness ofhis own being or way ofbeing, or ofhis
social condition, or the relations of outside objects to himself and to each other".40
It was "emotional insanity" which was under attack. The two sides of the debate
wereclearly taken bythose like Esquirol, who envisioned acomplete separation ofthe
human faculties ofwill, intelligence, and feeling-maintaining that any one of these
could be independently affected by a lesion resulting in a state ofpartial insanity-
35Ibid., pp. 152-8.
36 G. E. Berrios, 'Obsessional disorders during the nineteenth century: terminological and classificatory
issues', in W. F. Bynum, R. Porter, and M. Shepherd(eds.), Theanatomy ofmadness. essays in thehistoryof
psychiatry, vol. 1, People and ideas, London, Tavistock, 1985, pp. 166-87.
7 Werlinder, op. cit., note 21 above.
38 J. E. D. Esquirol, Mental maladies, a treatise on insanity, transl. E. K. Hunt, Philadelphia, Lea &
Blanchard, 1845, p. 351.
39 Raymond de Saussure 'The influence ofthe concept ofmonomania on French medico-legal psychiatry
(from 1825 to 1840)', J. Hist. Med., 1946, 1: 373. There were voices within the medical community which
also protested the likely effects that concepts such as monomania would have at law. To these critics,
"homicidal monomania" was (simply) "murderous fury" and they called for the punishment ofthose who
committed crimes while in such state. "There is crime on the part ofa madman when the means ofcarrying
out the act have been weighed and carried out in order to satisfy a desire that is contrary to the eternal
moral law. Ifinsanity is to be made anexception, the law only intended it to be in cases where no motive for
murder could be found." Ibid.
40 Ibid., p. 377.
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and those members ofthe medical (and legal) profession who insisted that whatever
the affective state offunctioning, without a corresponding condition ofdelirium, the
agitation did not amount to insanity.4' Although asylum registers reveal that as a
diagnosis, monomania fell from psychiatric favour shortly after the mid-point ofthe
nineteenth century,42 it must be admitted that the passions, long recognized but
relegated to marginal significance, had finally made their influence felt in the
conceptualization ofinsanity.43
The nature of the relationship between the emotions and insanity was also the
subject ofspeculation for a group ofmedico-philosophical writers in Scotland, who
rejected the more physiologically-based assumptions of English associationism in
favour of a return to a conception of the mind as constituted by innate, inductive
faculties. Members ofthe Common Sense School conceived ofa mind endowed with
its own capacities to respond to sensation and to employ these faculties to form
combinations of ideas.44 Inherent faculties of attention, memory, imagination, and
comparison actively sorted, arranged, and stored the ideaswhichconstituted the basis
for knowledge. The faculty of comparison was singled out by John Conolly in his
1830 treatise on insanity: "themadman concludes that what is only illusion is reality".
When the faculty ofcomparison cannot be exerted, when the person cannot examine
and revise his "morbid association, respecting the motives offriends or relatives" the
mind is no longer sane.45 According to this asylum superintendent and author, the
culprits responsible for the insanity are the passions and emotions which so excite the
imagination that the mind is disturbed by "a direct impairment of the comparing
power, and consequently, the judgment".46 With reason "dethroned", the will is no
longer restrained by judgement and the afflicted is perforce driven madly by his
passions: "it is only when the passion so impairs one or more faculties ofthe mind as
to prevent the exercise of comparison, that the reason is overturned".47
41 According to Goldstein, Esquirol was also initially convinced that intellectual delirium attended
monomania, but later changed his opinion due to pressures emanating from within his circle to present a
united front to the legal community regarding the independence of a "lesion of the will" in Georget's
monomanie homicide. Goldstein, op. cit., note 34 above, p. 174. Also see Esquirol's comments regarding
monomania: "the understanding is more or less affected; were it not thus, the insane would permit
themselves to be controlled by their understanding, and would discover that their views were false, and
their actions unusual and strange", Esquirol, op. cit., note 38 above, p. 321.
42 Goldstein, op. cit., note 34 above, p. 191. For an extended analysis of monomania's decline, see
pp. 189-96. Further shortcomings of the monomania concept are described in Berrios, op. cit., note 36
above, pp. 170-1.
43 Although Gall had referred to his psychological attributes as "determinate faculties", the affective
component of the "organ oflove ofoffspring", the "organ ofvanity," "the organ ofambition", and the
"disposition to murder" begged the question ofinsanity as primarily a matter of intellectual delirium. In
fact, in declaring his differences with Locke's conception ofinsanity, Gall had cited Pinel's discovery that
furiously insane persons frequently experienced no derangement of the intellectual faculties. Pinel's
descriptions, Gall reported, revealed insane persons showing no symptoms ofwandering with respect to
memory, imagination, or judgement. The Weekly Medico-Chirurgical and Philosophical Magazine, 2
Aug. 1823, no. 26, pp. 18-21; 19 July 1823, no. 24, p. 369.
4Hoeldtke, op. cit., note II above, pp. 55-63. See also G. P. Brooks, 'The faculty psychology ofThomas
Reid', J. Hist. behav. Sci., 1976, 12: 65-77; and Frank M. Albrecht, 'A reappraisal offaculty psychology',
ibid., 1970, 6: 36-40.
45 John Conolly, An inquiry concerning the indicationsofinsanity with suggestionsfor the better careofthe
insane, London, John Taylor, 1830, p. 155.
46 Ibid., p. 225.
4 Ibid., p. 277.
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Where Conolly spoke of the will only after placing his attention squarely on the
defective faculty ofcomparison, James Cowles Prichard sought to enlarge the inquiry
into the pathology ofmental processes by considering the emotions (or the passions)
to be "another class of mental phenomena distinct in their nature from ideas".48
Although he did not deny that derangement could lodge in a disordered exercise of
intellectual faculties, he also believed that madness consisted in "a morbid perversion
of the feelings, affections, and active powers, without any illusion or erroneous
conviction impressed upon theunderstanding".49 Themoral character, the affections,
the temper, the morbid feelings could themselves be deranged. By "moral insanity"
Prichard signified,
the loss ofvoluntary power over the succession ofideas [which] is so great in a certain
period of dementia that the individual affected is incapable by an effort of mind of
carrying on the series ofthoughts to the end ofa sentence or proposition. He hears a
question, apprehends sometimes its meaning, and attempts to answer; but before he
has uttered the half of his reply, his mind becomes confused and bewildered, some
accidental suggestion turns aside the current of his ideas, which are too loosely
associated to remain, even in a short train, coherent: his expressions become
consequently absurd and irrelevant.50
In this state ofinstinctive madness, the individual has not failed to understand the
wrongfulness ofhis actions because he was "confused" or "deluded". Rather, "some
ruling passion seems to have entire possession ofthe mind, and the hallucination is in
harmony within it, and seems to have its origin in the entire excitement of the
predominant feeling."5' The impulsive nature of the will impels the person into
motiveless, revolting criminal activity. Prichard's assertion that the act of the
madman is for the most part without motive emphasized the non-rational, indeed
self-destructive, component found in many cases of insane criminality. The
inexplicable nature of some bizarre criminal activity-stealing unwanted items,
killing a beloved infant-seemed to exemplify the tragic consequences of moral
insanity. The lack of a motive-indeed the very want of any logical reason for the
act-suggested a blind force that "neither reason nor sentiment determine" and
which the will has no longer the power to control.52
48 James C. Prichard, A review of the doctrine of a vital principle as maintained by some writers on
phrenology. With observations onphysicalandanimallife, London, Sherwood, Gilbert & Piper, 1829,p. 176.
49 Idem, A treatise on insanityandotherdisorders affecting themind, London, Sherwood, Gilbert & Piper,
1835, p. 12.
50 Ibid., p. 95.
51 James C. Prichard, On the differentforms ofinsanity in relation tojurisprudence, designedfor the use of
persons concerned in legal questions regarding unsoundness ofmind, 2nd ed., London Hippolyte Bailliere,
1847, p. 69.
52 Prichardapparentlyhoped toconvey intheclassification, moral insanity, adegreeofawareness ofone's
actions without a corresponding exercise of the functions of comprehension and understanding. Moral
insanity therefore consisted in the suspension ofthe mind's faculties, but not an absence ofconsciousness.
It was the suspension of the former which theoretically rendered him irresponsible at law. It must be
acknowledged that the nature of the afflicted's consciousness is difficult to comprehend: he does not
"understand" why he isengaged in theactivity, but he is not unmindful that he iscarrying out somehorrific
deed either.
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Prichard's attention to will makes explicit a change in the conception of partial
insanity which had begun with the French school. As late as the early nineteenth
century, Cullen could still characterize partial insanity as a false or mistaken
judgement on one particular subject. A second meaning for partial insanity emerged
with Pinel and Esquirol: a condition, variously referred to as manie sans delire or a
"lesion of the will", in which the judgement was not directly affected. The fullest
statement ofthis condition was to be found in monomania: an emotional insanity in
which the intellect was over-ridden, but not itselfderanged. As with the intellectualist
conception of partial insanity, monomania narrowed the concept of delirium to
derangement on one subject, but unlike the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
associationist school, the French approach to circumscribed derangement included a
spur to action. Monomaniacs, according to Esquirol, were not only deluded on one
point, but exhibited heightened levels of excitation and even audacity. Georget had
been even more predictive: persons afflicted with monomanie homicide were impelled
to translate apreoccupation with theidea ofmurderinto action.53 Although members
of the Scottish Common Sense school were not as specific regarding the ineluctable
consquences of moral insanity, the will and its perversion at the hands of inflamed
passion was much more in focus than in the previous century. The thrust of the
French school of medecin mentale and Common Sense philosophy was therefore to
remove the will from its normative subjugation by the intellect and to endow it, along
with the emotions, with a life (and destructive force) ofits own. Monomania could be
intellectual, affective, or instinctual. Moral insanity could over-ride the intellect while
the individual was carried away by perverted feelings.
The narrowing ofinsanity to signify partial states ofderangement thus fragmented
the unity of the actor's mental integrity: will, intellect, or emotion could each suffer
discrete impairment. Or rather, the afflicted might be clinically, or philosophically, so
described. Whether he could be legally deranged when his intellect was left more or
less intact had yet to be negotiated with the court.
DELUSION IN THE COURTROOM
In 1830, Gilbert McMurdo, Surgeon ofNewgate, concluded his testimony with the
following words: "We consider delusions a very common test ofinsanity; and that of
a man's family conspiring against him is one ofthe most common, and what we are
apt to regard as a test of an unsound state of mind."54 The significance of these
remarks extends beyond the fact that they were offered in open court by a medical
man in the employ of Newgate Gaol. While medical witnesses had been giving
evidence in insanity trials since 1760, McMurdo was the first to speak ofa "test"; the
presence ofa condition sufficient to find insanity. His testimony, and that ofhalfthe
medical witnesses who appeared at the Old Bailey between 1825 and 1843 to speak on
behalf ofthe prisoner's plea ofinsanity-and provided grounds for their inference-
described a conscious, purposeful act generated by a false belief: in other words, a
53 de Saussure, op. cit., note 39 above, pp. 370-2. For a discussion ofthe debate surrounding monomanie
homicide, see Goldstein, op. cit., note 37 above, pp. 170-8.
54 OBSP, 1830, First Session, p. 91.
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reasoning mania. Although clinicians and authors of medical texts beginning with
Cullen and Pinel had made the transition from total to partial insanity, the
long-standing rejection of partial insanity on the part of English criminal
jurisprudence presaged a much more sceptical audience when medical witnesses
proffered their construction ofa limited insanity in court. And this scepticism did not
wane with the years. McMurdo's summary comments in 1830 established no more of
an obvious precedent for delusion as the "test" of insanity than had Thomas
Erskine's articulate and innovative use ofdelusion in the defence of James Hadfield
30 years earlier. Something more than simple scepticism on the part ofthe court kept
delusion, monomania, and moral insanity from establishing themselves as the "test"
of insanity.
The protean character ofmadness itself meant that insanity, and consequently the
limits of criminal responsibility, had to be defined anew at every trial. Although the
mental state ofthe prisoner was ofobvious relevance to the trial, it was not the mental
stateper sewhich thejurors had to divine. Juries were asked to discover ifthe prisoner
had retained an ability to "know what he was about", or to distinguish right from
wrong, not to detect the presence ofdelusion, lunacy or melancholia. Also, as late as
1785, judicial instructions reminded the court that "it must be a total derangement of
the mind ... however it may approach to that degree ofdisorder ... yet unless it goes
that length, it does not amount to a justification".55 Medical witnesses who stopped
short of global delirium in their characterization of the prisoner's mental state
therefore faced a formidable task: how to explain that the defendant could be
conscious of his actions and yet fail to understand their moral wrongfulness.
To reconcile this seeming contradiction, medical witnesses alluded to images of
mental functioning which challenged the notion of the mind as an integrated unit.
They asked jurors to consider a form of insanity which consisted of a circumscribed,
limited derangement, referred to as either "delusion"" or "monomania"'. Partial
insanity in the second quarter of the nineteenth century was not derangement by
degrees (historic melancholia) but rather a capacity for the mind to house both
rationality and madness simultaneously. Evidence suggesting the prisoner's clear
reasoning on one particular subject in no way precluded the possibility of deep
derangement in another area of his thinking. Nor was the forensic witnesses' use ofa
limited insanity similar to the traditional notion of lunacy, in which delirium and
lucidity alternated with one another. Instead, reasoning and madness could be
manifest at the same moment, a condition Gall had referred to as partial alienation.56
In their descriptions of prisoners in such a mental condition, medical witnesses
challenged the court's practice of calling an insanity plea into question by asking
witnesses to recount events on the day of the crime which evinced thought or
planning.57 Contrivance could now be redefined as (mono)maniacal pursuit, rather
than as cleverness that betokened rationality, and hence, intention.
5 OBSP, 1785, Sixth Session, p. 875.
56 For Gall's views on partial alienation, see The Weekly Medico-Chirurgical Philosophical Magazine, no.
25, 26 July 1823, pp. 2-3; on intermittent alienations, see 19 July 1823, no. 24, p. 369.
57 For example, see Mansfield's comments at the trial of James Bellingham for the murder of Spencer
Perceval, in Eigen, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 46-7.
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Testifying in 1833, the physician and author David Uwins explained to the court
why the prisoner's obvious planning and execution of a forgery did not alter his
opinion that she was, in fact, insane:
Among my patients at the Institution, they have gone through the process of
reasoning for the object they have in desire, as a sane person would the act itself, I
should not call an act of insanity, but should conclude that an individual, being
insane, could perform that act; there may be considerable imbecility ofmind, and yet
the process of reasoning exist I conceive it possible for an individual to act as the
prisoner did with respect to this cheque, without knowing the degree ofresponsibility
under which she herself must stand in reference to it.58
Asked specifically by the court: "Do you conceive all this stratagem might be
employed without a consciousness of there being anything wrong in it", Uwins
replied: "I conceive it possible, having seen several instances where the object has
been ofless importance". All the prisoner's planning, all the contrivance displayed in
"obtaining her object" did not encompass her appreciating the "responsibility under
which she herselfmust stand with reference to it". To underline this last point, Uwins
stated, "I don't think she was in a state to distinguish right from wrong at the time of
this affair". The apothecary Thomas Halifax, who followed him into the witness box,
expounded the question of a limited insanity:
I consider a disorder ofsome intellectual faculty a symptom ofinsanity, monomania
is insanity, relative to one particular subject, distinguished from a disordered intellect
relative to all affairs ... it is known that insane persons have pursued an object with a
degree of cunning which belongs to very few except the most exalted talents.59
Conscious ofher actions-indeed, shrewd in accomplishing her ends-the prisoner
was nonetheless, jurors learned, not "in a state to distinguish right from wrong at the
time of this affair". What inferences about the mind were they to draw from such a
description? First, consciousness and purposeful action were apparently not eclipsed
by madness. The single-minded pursuit of an objective might seem like rationality,
but it was an idiosyncratic form of reason because it was disconnected from related
faculties ofjudgement and understanding: the exercise ofreason was restricted to one
subject only. A second implication followed. Understanding the sequence of steps
necessary to accomplish one's ends need not necessarily extend to appreciating the
moral context in which one's actions are pursued. Uwins left no doubt that, though
perfectly capable ofknowing how to execute a plan, the prisoner was not capable of
knowing the (criminal) responsibility to which she exposed herself. Insanity so
described had little in common with "wild beast" delirium familiar to the early
eighteenth century. This defendant, a functioning, conscious, purposeful actor, was
yet described by the asylum physician as irresponsible due to her monomaniacal
preoccupation.
The frequency with which medical witnesses in the nineteenth century invoked
delusion, the unselfconscious manner in which family members commented upon it,
58 OBSP, 1833, Seventh Session, p. 733.
59 Ibid., p. 734.
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and the courts asked about it, suggests a level offamiliarity with a word which, only a
short time before, was rarely ifever spoken in criminal court. Jurors at the Old Bailey
were not given a medical explanation of restricted impairment in associationist,
phrenological, or faculty-psychology language. Rather, physicians, surgeons, and
apothecaries employed everyday language and common-sense images to depict the
extreme behavioural variability that resulted when a person's mind "laboured" under
some delusion.
What was uncommon about their testimony was how it called into question
assumptions about the mind's ability either to integrate intended action with moral
consequence, or to maintain a consistent state of consciousness, particularly an
awareness of what one was "about". In the following extract, delirium was said to
follow the mentioning of a subject upon which the afflicted individual was
preoccupied:
when he was not in this state of delirium I should say he was generally capable of
knowing right from wrong, and conducting his own affairs ... when he became calm
he never spoke of these acts, nor allow himself to be spoken to on it .60
But, as the physician explained, when the prisoner's mind was unsettled, he was
'"unconscious of what was passing". Of what use was the criterion "knowing what
one was about" ifthe mind was subject to states ofconsciousness which at times left
the person oblivious to what was immediately transpiring but at other times permitted
active circumnavigation around delirious shoals? Medical witnesses might affirm that
a prisoner could indeed distinguish right from wrong, yet still stand not accountable
for his or her acts because of an unsound mind brought on by a "state ofhysterical
insensibility", once the delusion was touched upon.
In sum, although the capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to know what one
was "about" may have historically functioned to separate the totally insane from
those who suffered only "derangement by degrees", the utility of these criteria
became increasingly doubtful when medical witnesses proffered a view of the mind's
functioning in which thecapacity to distinguish right from wrong was subject-just as
all "knowing" functions were subject-to the overall state ofwell-being. There simply
was no general faculty of "knowing right from wrong", or "knowing what one was
about" which had the power to correct a delusion and by so doing alert the afflicted
that the action which flowed from the false belief was morally transgressive. The
limited insanity which medical witnesses introduced into courtroom testimony took
one of two forms: a reasoning mania (symbolized by contrivance or monomanical
pursuit) or an episodic descent into deep distraction (occasionally referred to as
delirium) when the subject of profound anxiety was touched upon. In both cases,
delusion or monomania signified the presence ofan area offunctioning in which any
customary capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to "know what one was
about" did not intrude. The following table reveals the frequency with which
"delusion" and "monomania" were mentioned by 34 medical witnesses who supplied
a reason (or reasons) for their insanity diagnosis.
60 OBSP, 1842-43, Twelfth Session, p. 1005-6.
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Terms employed to support the inference ofinsanity, 1825-1843
Term Frequency
Delusion 14
Monomania 3
Brain fever, Organic brain disease 2
Derangement: about the eyes, melancholic 2
Eccentric, delirious 2
Conversation: flighty, incoherent 2
Epilepsy I
Bowel complaint I
Termination of blood to head, in consequence of an epileptic fit 1
Brain injury in battle 1
"Approached" an imbecile, idiocy 1
A singular inability as regards the affections 1
State of lunacy, delirious I
Puerperal mania I
Head was "affected" I
"Peculiar look": quivering of lips, face effused with blood I
Contrivance I
Perversion of the moral feeling I
Lesion of the will, moral insanity I
Out of the pale of self control I
Insensibility I
Included in the above array are several references to organic orphysicalist "causes"
of insanity which medical witnesses sometimes used in situating delusion or
monomania in an overall picture of mental functioning. The following testimony
extracts suggest that the eighteenth-century tendency to associate mental disturbance
with damaged nerve endings or faulty cerebral circuitry had, by the second quarter of
the nineteenth century, extended to include a consideration of the role of general
somatic disturbance in the derangement ofmental faculties. In 1827, the surgeon Mr
Houghton responded to a question regarding whether delusions were the test of
insanity, with the following:
Certainly; I have heard the woman's account of his bowel complaint; its being
attended with bleedingwould be very beneficial to his state ofmind; it would improve
it, and on his getting stronger, the delusion would be more likely to return.61
One hears in Mr Houghton's words a compelling echo ofthe centuries-earlier remedy
of inducing haemorrhoidal bleeding as a measure to relieve melancholia-an
affliction often attended with delusion.62 Although the surgeon did not explain what
effect bleeding would necessarily have on the intensity ofthe prisoner's delusion, his
comments resonated with cultural as well as medical assumptions about the easy
traffic between physical changes and brain function; in this case, the strength of a
61 OBSP, 1827, Seventh Session, p. 628.
62 Jackson, op. cit., note 16 above, p. 31.
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false belief. The association of blood flow and delusion was made a year later by
another surgeon, John Fenner, who, when asked to speak about the relation between
the prisoner's fits and his derangement, responded thus:
I was called to attend the prisoner in February 1827, and found him suffering from a
violent hemorrhage from the nose, in consequence of a termination of blood to the
head, which was very probably caused by great excitement of the mind ...63
The witness's comments reveal that the traffic between the mind and pathological
physical change could indeed be two-way. The implication of his words-as of
Houghton's as well-was that the intensity of the delusions was associated with
physical changes which, in some unspecified way, had affected brain function.
In 1840, jurors learned of a therapeutic connection between delusions and blood
flow during the trial of a man indicted for the attempted murder of his wife. The
prisoner, a medical man himself, endeavoured to persuade the court of his lack of
"intent to do [his wife] any serious injury or any bodily harm" because, he explained,
"I most decidedly sayit must be adelusion altogether". Afterthejury learned that the
prisoner believed his wife to be "poisoning him by degrees ... putting arsenic into his
lips while he was sleeping. . .", they next heard from amedical witness who was asked
by the court: "What was his delusion?" Samuel Taylor responded, "He thought his
disease was more important than it was-he considered he should die and had
sleepless nights". The prisoner apparently feared that thejury would doubt the extent
of his distress and asked the witness: "Did you not sometimes see me three times in
the course of a day?" The surgeon-apothecary replied: "I have . . . bled you very
largely one morning, by desire of Dr. Scudamore-you had blisters applied to the
nape ofyour neck many times". Dr Scudamore next took the stand, asserting that he
believed the prisoner to have been "in a state ofmonomania, in which case he would
very readily have his ideas perverted, and take up with any delusions that might
engage his thoughts and feelings". He then explained his choice of treatment:
I considered the indication of the brain, at my first visit, to be of an inflammatory
nature, and with which I thought the heart sympathised-I judged it expedient and
necessary to direct the removal of blood [addressing the prisoner:]-although you
never recovered, you got into a better state of health-the medicines were
administered on the same view of the disease as that on which I directed the
abstraction of blood . . . except as related to your disorder, I did not find any
irregularity ofmind.'
Aside from the singular drama supplied by a medical witness explaining treatment
protocol to a patient on trial for the near-fatal assault on his wife, one also sees a
further affirmation of the association drawn between changes in blood flow-to
relieve the brain's "inflammatory nature"-and the resulting "better state ofhealth",
presumably a diminution in the intensity of his delusion.
63 OBSP, 1828, Sixth Session, p. 624.
64 OBSP, 1840-41, First Session, p. 25.
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The willingness of medical witnesses to situate mental pathology in somatic
disturbance did not extend to invoking the most widely known conceptual scheme for
conjoining physiology and behaviour: phrenology. The contemporary phrenological
literature, on the other hand, invoked criminal behaviour time and time again to
support its most fundamental tenet: the independence of psychological faculties.65
Such a depiction of the mind's functioning enabled phrenologists to account for
outrageous acts by seemingly rational people. That an insane person could execute a
plan-contrive a forgery?-with cunning and methodological sophistication, need
hardly remain a mystery. It was the "organ of covetousness" or the "organ of
cunning" which was implicated as the medium responsible for an insane act
committed by an otherwise law-abiding person. Given the currency ofphrenology in
the second quarter ofthe nineteenth century in both lay and scientific circles-indeed
the largest group ofprofessionals comprising the membership rolls in the first halfof
the nineteenth century were medical practitioners66-one is struck by the absence of
phrenological images in the years which witnessed the tremendous growth of expert
testimony in insanity trials.
Although there is no reason to suspect thatmostwitnesses necessarily subscribed to
phrenological principles, there was at least one prominent phrenologist who made an
appearance at the Old Bailey. David Uwins, whose testimony in a forgery trial was
discussed earlier, wrote several books on brain disorders and contributed to magazine
articles and encyclopaedia entries on the subject ofphrenology. His medical writing
may have been grounded in cerebral matter, but not his courtroom testimony. The
strength ofphrenology, he had written,
consists in its having discarded imaginative reasoning, and sent it back to its proper
province; and in having taught us to regard everything that concerns the living
principle as futile and unsubstantial, beyond whatcan bemade out upon the common
principles ofphysics.67
Yet in his court appearance in 1833, these sentiments are not expressed. He testified
instead to the prisoner's cunning (but not about her organ ofcunning) and to the fact
that, though her process of reasoning might exist, there remained considerable
65 Infanticide, for example, was often explained with reference to the "organ ofparental and filial love".
See C. W. Hufeland, Some account ofDr. Gall's new theory ofphysiognomy, London, Longman, Hurst,
Rees, & Orme, 1807. A murder in 1819, attributed to the unfortunate felon's enlarged "organ of
destructiveness", is described in George and Andrew Coombe, On thefunctions ofthe cerebellum by Drs.
Gall, Vimont, andBroussais, Edinburgh, Machlachlan & Stewart, 1838, pp. 162-7. Furtherexamples ofthe
uses of crime and other desperate acts to support phrenological principles may be found in Charles A.
Blode, Dr. F. J. Gall's system of thefunctions of the brain, 1807; Andrew Coombe, Observations on the
mental derangement being an application of the principles ofphrenology to the elucidation of the causes,
symptoms, nature and treatment ofinsanity, Boston, Marsh, Cape & Lyon, 1834; and Forbes Winslow, The
principles ofphrenology as applied to the elucidation and cure ofinsanity, London, S. Highley, 1832. For a
discussion of the specific importance of the evidence ofmonomania to the arguments ofphrenology, see
Roger Cooter, 'Phrenology and British alienists, ca. 1825-1845', in Andrew Scull (ed.), Madhouses,
mad-doctors, andmadmen: the social history ofpsychiatry in the Victorian Era, Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1981, pp. 58-104.
66 Cooter, op. cit., note 29 above, p. 93.
67 David Uwins, A treatise on thedisordersofthebrain andnervoussystem which areusually consideredand
are called mental, London, Renshaw & Rush, 1833, p. 15.
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imbecility of mind. No attempt was made to situate her imbecility of mind in
damaged or pathological development of particular organs of the brain.
One might suspect that although phrenology enjoyed considerable popularity in
both lay and at least some scientific circles, the language it employed-"organs" of
determinate faculties, for example-was too unfamiliar, too far removed from the
discourse ofthe layman, to be taken seriously by the court. While medical witnesses
did introduce physicalist concepts into their discussion ofdelusion and monomania,
the materialism inherent in an "organ ofdestructiveness" threatened the substitution
of an unproven, and to some minds far-fetched, "science ofcharacter" for the more
culturally intelligible concepts ofintent and "knowledge ofwhat one was about". The
importance of sensitivity to the forum in which they were testifying was not lost on
medical writers of the early decades of the nineteenth century, who cautioned their
colleagues to keep their language intelligible to the non-specialist. Accordingly,
analysis oftheir courtroom testimony in the second quarter ofthe century reveals that
medical witnesses were very careful how they spoke about will and the capacity of
human choice. Only in the fifth decade of the century did physicians and surgeons
actually mention the issue of self control. When they did, their imagery was initially
devoid of Prichard's notions ofmoral insanity. Speaking in 1840, a medical witness
averred:
I have seen him from time to time in states when I believe he was out ofthepale ofself
control I really cannot say whether that arose from an obstinate, perverse or wicked
disposition, or from his mind being disordered ... I have seen him at times so excited
that he is not answerable for his actions indeed has no control over himself . . .68
The most articulate pairing ofdelusion with loss of self-control was made only at
the very end ofthe period under review, during the trial ofDaniel McNaughtan. Nine
physicians and surgeons testified in the celebrated trial ofSir Robert Peel's would-be
assassin, many addressing their remarks to the force inherent in the delusion itself
which led McNaughtan to the offence. The McNaughtan jury was told that the
prisoner's act "flowed from those delusions . . . he was not under the ordinary
restraint by which persons in general are bound in theirconduct; his moral liberty was
destroyed".69 Asked directly by the court if the prisoner was "capable ofexercising
selfcontrol and resisting the impulse to which he yielded" one medical witness replied
that any act which flowed from his delusion was an irresistible one: "the impulse was
so strong that nothing.short of a physical impossibility, would prevent him from
performing any act which his delusion might impel him to do".70 Added another
physician: "I mean the black spot on his mind, regarding the delusion . . . the
commission of that act is placed beyond his moral control'".7'
"Delusion" had progressed from a disturbance of thought, and false belief, to a
force which removed self-determination from the sphere ofone's control, and this was
68 OBSP, 1842-43, Twelfth Session, pp. 1006-7.
69 OBSP, 1843, Fifth Session, p. 760.
70 Ibid., p. 761.
71 Ibid., p. 762.
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fast becoming the Victorian view ofmental disorder. As Michael Clarke has written,
the "Ego or psychical person lost its power of self-determination and regressed to
'lower', more automatic levels of psychological functioning, the mind becoming
increasingly absorbed either by delusive constructions based on internal, 'subjective'
sensations (as in hysteria and hypochondriasis) or by externally suggested dominant
ideas (as in hypnosis)".72 Behaviour now revealed the force of dominant ideas and
instincts; rational inquiry and interpretation were closed offas conduct became more
impulsive, automatic, irresponsible.
Although medical witnesses certainly found their clearest voice regarding delusion
and compulsion in the McNaughtan trial, testimony found in the OBSP leading up to
1843 records physicians and surgeons speaking in terms ofa mind "labouring under a
delusion", disposed to delusion [with] a perversion ofthe moral feeling", and "out of
the pale of self control". Jurors and others at the Old Bailey learned of the
autonomous force of the passions, the morbid sentiments, and the resulting
monomaniacal pursuit of an objective which had impelled the prisoner into criminal
activity. Could a mind preoccupied with threatening and compelling sensation be
capable of applying customarily understood norms of morality to the action it
contemplated? Medical witnesses who spoke in terms of the prisoner's "antecedent
delusion [leading] to one particular offence or another", and the need to "take into
account the exceeding cunning connected with mental alienation, especially when
there is intention toaccomplish anobject" challenged traditional criteria forassessing
intent, which had relied exclusively on the "knowing" faculties. The integration of
intellectual faculties could easily be fragmented by the will, which had the power to
"modify the association among ideas ... and . .. the results to which the important
principles of association give rise".73
It appears, therefore, that by the mid-nineteenth century partial insanity had
extended beyond the associationist tenets ofa Cullen or an Arnold, who restricted its
meaning to a falsejudgement on a particular subject. Reflected in medical testimony
in the second quarter of the century were the ideas of Esquirol, Georget, and
Prichard, whose views of limited derangement revealed the separate force of the
perverted will-with or without intellectual confusion. This was a novel sort of
derangement: self-control-not intellectual coherence-was the primary loss. The
intellect, heretofore the "higher" power which customarily subdued the "rabble" in
the psyche, could now be over-ridden in the wake ofa passionate, wilful, pursuit ofan
objective. More frightening still, the intellect might retain its lucidity even as the will,
diseased in its own right, impelled the actor into criminality.
Perhaps the most graphic rendering ofthe association ofdelusion with compulsion
was supplied by a prisoner in 1830 when he uttered his Defence at the end ofthe trial.
James Sisk was indicted for having fired a pistol at an attendant in the House of
Lords. The prisoner had arrived at the Lords to see the Duke ofWellington to report
on the commission he had received from God. As the defendant testified:
72 Michael Clark, 'The rejection of psychological approaches to mental disorder in late
nineteenth-century British psychiatry' in Scull (ed.), op. cit., note 65 above, p. 274.
73 Prichard, op. cit., note 49 above, p. 94.
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I did what I was commissioned to do by God Almighty ... it is ten years since God
gave me the commission, I went to Baltimore to get a commission-but by the
providence ofGod I did not succeed . . . I went to the city, and gave myselfout to be a
prophet to warn them all of the approaching destruction; I came home to this
country-it wore off, but it would not letme be quiet; I came to London a fewmonths
ago ... and I pledged to Almighty God that I would then go and preach to the people
if he would spare me . . .7
Apparently, the defendant was waiting outside the House ofLords to tell the Duke of
Wellington ofhis progress in encouraging Londoners to repent, when the unfortunate
guard tried to remove him, and was fired upon. Clearly, the assault on the guard was
not directly dictated by the delusion, but thejury acquitted the defendant, doubtless
taking the surgeon, Gilbert McMurdo's, words to heart: "We consider delusions a
very common test of insanity".75
PARTIAL INSANITY IN LEGAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
In addition to providing historians of medicine with evidence of the diffusion of
clinical concepts ofpartial insanity into the courtroom setting, trial narratives found
in the OBSP also offer clues regarding how inhabitants of early modern England
conceived of mental processes, particularly the working of the distracted mind. As
cited earlier, lay concurrence in the medical interpretation oflunacy, discernible in the
profusion of non compos mentis findings recorded in suicide inquests in the late
seventeenth century, provided Michael MacDonald with compelling evidence of the
increasing secularization of a disordered condition which, for centuries, had been
consigned to supernatural forces. In like manner, the proclivity ofjurors to entertain
the legal merits of an insanity plea raised by prisoners who understood, at a certain
level, what they were about-and who may have customarily possessed a general
capacity to distinguish right from wrong-suggests a lay willingness to move beyond
an exclusively intellectualist conception ofthe mind to a consideration ofthe potency
of will and emotion in human, and particularly criminal, behaviour.
The medical witnesses' achievement was not the mystification of jurors with
esoteric jargon, or the redefinition of madness in exclusively organic terminology.
Rather, expert testimony in the second quarter of the nineteenth century skilfully
employed common-sense imagery and familiar terms to question the court's long-
standing criterion, which had functioned to restrict the scope of insanity acquittals.
That only those totally incapable ofdistinguishing right from wrong could be said to
lack the will to harm relied on the notion ofthe natural subjugation ofthe will to the
intellect. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, jurors, court
bystanders, and readers of the OBSP alike learned that the intellect could be
overridden in the wake of a passionate pursuit of an object. The passions could, by
themselves and with no accompanying "error in judgment", compel the actor to
commit a crime. Though the prospect ofsuch impulsive behaviour might have seemed
frightening, one notes the temperate language English medical men used in suggesting
74 OBSP, 1830, First Session, p. 90.
75 Ibid., p. 91.
47Joel Peter Eigen
the limits of the "knowing" faculties. There is mention of monomania, but not
homicidal monomania. A phrenologist speaks of cunning, but not an organ of
cunning. Rather, medical testimony conveyed the image of a delusion or a state of
monomania removing the capacity for self-control once the mind became
"unsettled". One experienced release from the "ordinary restraint by which
individuals in general are bound in their conduct". "Delusion", the term most
frequently invoked by medical witnesses in the early nineteenth century, conveyed a
"suspension of the controlling will".76
The foregoing is not meant to imply that documenting a delusion was sufficient
proof, or an indisputable "test" ofinsanity. Although delusions were good evidence
ofmadness, Roger Smith has correctly asserted that the misperception had to be ofa
certain quality to answer the law's concern, namely "did [the prisoner] know that he
was committing an offence against the laws of God and nature?"77 It was precisely
the faculty of knowing which medical witnesses questioned when they described the
state of the intellect once a person's will was seized by preoccupation. With all
thought concentrated on the delusive fear or monomaniacal idea, what was the
likelihood that a general knowledge of the difference between right and wrong, or
"knowing what one was about" might actually intrude upon an idee fixe? If the
afflicted could not apply reason to correct the delusion, how could he or she be
expected to apply standards ofright and wrong to acts compelled by the false belief?
The testimony ofthe medical witnesses, and the subsequent acquittal ofmost ofthese
defendants, strongly suggest that jurors answered the question regarding the
prisoner's knowledge about the illegality oftheir actions by considering the degree of
compulsion attendant to the false belief. When jurors heard such statements as, "it
would not let me be quiet" and "something came over me" and "his delusion leads to
one particular offence or another", the utility of the centuries-old criterion of
knowing right from wrong for assessing intent was directly called into question.
These prisoners were not suffering from a cognitive failure or a moral lapse. Their
own words, and those of medical witnesses, vividly illustrate a state of delirium in
which the will was released to do delusion's bidding. Thus the ship's captain acted
only as he could, to save himselffrom his tormentor, the owner ofthe shipping lines.
His inability to recognize the error in his thinking did not affect his ability to
command the ship. Yet once the name of his supposed nemesis was uttered, his
odd-not to say burlesque-antics marked him as a man "without choice". Does
anyone choose to dance on broken glass? His inability to exercise moral choice under
such a state of mental confusion was doubtless the critical consideration. When
another prisoner, who passionately believed that his brother was plotting to throw
him into a boiling cauldron, proceeded to assault his sibling, the jury must have
considered that thisunfortunate, deluded mancould not havechosen to do otherwise.
Similarly, would an individual who believed himself to be sent by God with a
heavenly commission, shrink from attacking a guard who actively prevented him
from completing his divinely-ordered task?
76 For a discussion of the nineteenth-century conception of the suspension of the controlling will, see
Smith, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 90-6. See also Hoeldtke, op. cit. note II above, p. 58.
77 Smith, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 94-5.
48Partial insanity in earlyforensic testimony
The element of compulsion alluded to in the above cases is of paramount
significance for the question of culpability because, as mentioned earlier, without
choice-without the will to inflict harm-the individual cannot be said to have acted
intentionally. In the eighteenth century, the question of intent was answered
predominantly byconsidering the prisoner's understanding, his knowledge ofwhat he
was about, and his appreciation of the consequences of his actions. Insanity was a
matter of impaired (or totally absent) reason. In their acceptance of "reasoning"
madness, jurors in the nineteenth century redefined legally-relevant mental
derangement to include a variety of states of being in which the intellect remained
more or less intact, though temporarily suspended or over-ridden.
Although new to the court, the notion that the human mind could perform
purposive acts which were nonetheless "unattended with consciousness" was gaining
increasing popular acceptance.78 Activities such as respiration and pulse, dreaming
and sleep-walking, exhibited forms of human action in which the individual's
conscious, intentional decision seemed to be absent. The inclusion ofmoral insanity,
delusion, and monomania into thecategory ofstates ofconsciousness in which reason
was either temporarily suspended or over-ridden did not make insanity "just like
sanity" but it did serve to normalize the crimes ofthe mad. The acquittal ofmost of
the defendants in whose trials delusion or monomania was raised suggests thejurors'
acceptance ofa new, and perhaps prominent role for the agency ofwill and emotion.
Although it is difficult to know how much weight to attach to the influence ofmedical
testimony in the refinement ofmadness from intellectual error to compulsion to act, it
seems clear that the concept ofpartial insanity drew the mad and the sane into much
closer proximity. Might the juror have recognized in the partially deranged not only
the similarity of states of consciousness in which reason failed, but a further
resemblance in the potency ofemotions not altogether restrainable by the intellect or
the customary will? Might he have recognized in the mad the presence of hidden,
treacherous forces which could lead any reasonable person into unintentional
criminality?
78 Porter, op. cit., note 14 above, pp. 180-1.
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